What it means to be pro-Israel

March 24th, 2010

An orthodox settler in Ramat Shlomo, an Israeli settlement in East Jerusalem.

Apologies for the long absence, but other obligations have put blogging on the back burner for a bit. In the meantime, I hope you were as confused as I was about the hacking of this blog.

I was actually abroad when the whole Ramat Shlomo debacle (announcing construction of new settlement units in East Jerusalem, while Biden was on his way to try to mend bilateral relations) went down.

A quick post here, then, in the slow-burning aftermath of the Netanyahu government’s continuing diplomatic missteps with allies. Robert Wright of the New America Foundation breathes some sanity into the debate over at nytimes.com, nicely countering some of the more … misguided arguments thrown into the debate over America’s Israel policy.

If Israel’s increasingly powerful right wing has its way, without constraint from American criticism and pressure, then Israel will keep building settlements. And the more settlements get built — especially in East Jerusalem — the harder it will be to find a two-state deal that leaves Palestinians with much of their dignity intact. And the less dignity intact, the less stable any two-state deal will be.

As more and more people are realizing, the only long-run alternatives to a two-state solution are: a) a one-state solution in which an Arab majority spells the end of Israel’s Jewish identity; b) Israel’s remaining a Jewish state by denying the vote to Palestinians who live in the occupied territories, a condition that would be increasingly reminiscent of apartheid; c) the apocalypse. Or, as Hillary Clinton put it in addressing the American Israel Public Affairs Committee conference on Monday: “A two-state solution is the only viable path for Israel to remain both a democracy and a Jewish state.”

One other thing: Israeli construction (with attendant evictions and house demolitions for Palestinians), which changes the facts on the ground in an attempt to gain a better position vis a vis the peace process, may end up destroying the peace process before it even resumes.

Deep, deep U.S. involvement in Yemen strikes: plus, killing al-Aulaqi

January 27th, 2010
Anwar al-Aulaqi, New Mexico-born and linked to al-Qaeda. The Bush administration authorized the CIA and later the American military to kill American citizens abroad if they are involved in terrorist actions against the U.S. (al-Jazeera)

Anwar al-Aulaqi, New Mexico-born and linked to al-Qaeda. The Obama administration is continuing a policy begun under the Bush administration, which authorizes the CIA and the American military to kill American citizens abroad if they are involved in terrorist actions against the U.S. (al-Jazeera)

The Washington Post scored a big story today with anonymous quotes from senior Obama administration officials about the extent of American involvement in recent air strikes. We knew this previously, but now, we know the details. And oh, what an extent:

The operations, approved by President Obama and begun six weeks ago, involve several dozen troops from the U.S. military’s clandestine Joint Special Operations Command (JSOC), whose main mission is tracking and killing suspected terrorists. The American advisers do not take part in raids in Yemen, but help plan missions, develop tactics and provide weapons and munitions. Highly sensitive intelligence is being shared with the Yemeni forces, including electronic and video surveillance, as well as three-dimensional terrain maps and detailed analysis of the al-Qaeda network.

As you can see, the U.S. is all but pulling the trigger. Clearly this is intended for domestic consumption, but this can’t play out well in Yemen and the broader region. Brian at Waq al-Waq has more on the subject; essentially, the U.S. has a lot to lose by making the arrangement so explicit.

On the plus side, with superior intelligence and advanced American technology, less civilians will die, since the strikes should be more accurate and better executed (emphasis on should). And to be sure, these strikes are selectively targeting al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula. On the minus side, the U.S. is one step removed from bombing Yemeni civilians. Guess which side will get more play in Yemen?

I have to say, though, I was most surprised by this graf (though perhaps I shouldn’t be):

As part of the operations, Obama approved a Dec. 24 strike against a compound where a U.S. citizen, Anwar al-Aulaqi, was thought to be meeting with other regional al-Qaeda leaders. Although he was not the focus of the strike and was not killed, he has since been added to a shortlist of U.S. citizens specifically targeted for killing or capture by the JSOC, military officials said.

Al-Jazeera interviewed (Arabic) al-Aulaqi in December about his connection to Nidal Hassan Malaki, the army psychiatrist awaiting trial for killing 12 soldiers and civilian at Fort Hood in Texas. The above WaPo article calls their communications “largely academic in nature.” Based on the interview, that description is misleading. Malaki expressed support for al-Aulaqi’s organization, asking how to donate money. He also asked about the religious legality of killing Israelis and Jews. And, connected to Fort Hood, al-Aulaqi said (translation mine) “He asked about killing American soldiers and officers: is that legal or not?”

All that said, this JSOC list contains “high value targets,” which ascribes … high value to him. Tautological, but important: the U.S. risks raising al-Aulaqi’s profile, along with his credibility and prestige (call it the outlaw factor: letting the world know he’s wanted, dead or alive, lends him respect to those who don’t much care for the U.S.). WaPo cites anonymous authorities saying “al-Aulaqi is the most important native, English-speaking al-Qaeda figure.”

If the charges about contacts with the failed Christmas Day bombing turn out to be true as well, they certainly have evidence to make that case. But this is most definitely a double-edged sword, where the U.S. risks elevating al-Aulaqi (much like Bush administration rhetoric did for Osama bin Laden), who can then flaunt the fact that he’s still alive and well, simultaneously mocking the military and security “failures” of the U.S. while portraying himself as the David to the American Goliath.

Note: Just for clarity’s sake, al-Aulaki’s name should really be transliterated as al-Awlaqi, but for whatever inexplicable reason, the Western media will continue to call him Aulaki. The best we can hope for, frankly, is Awlaki. But apparently that’s asking too much.

Kidnapped German family “located” in Yemen, AP reports

January 11th, 2010
Transporting the bodies of the three killed foreigners back from Saada to Sanaa in June 2009 (AP)

Transporting the bodies of the three killed foreigners back from Saada to Sanaa in June 2009 (AP)

I’ve long been following the story of nine kidnapped foreigners, abducted while picnicking in Saada last June. Two German women and one South Korean women were later found dead, and fate of the British national and a German family of five has been unknown — until now. Reports the Associated Press:

Yemeni authorities have located a German couple and their three children who have been held hostage in Yemen by unidentified kidnappers since June, German Foreign Minister Guido Westerwelle said on Monday.

“I have learnt from my conversation with the president that two hours ago the location of the hostages has become known,” Westerwelle told reporters in German after talks with President Ali Abdullah Saleh in Sanaa.

The kidnapping incited some of the first calls of “next Afghanistan,” back then by the EU anti-terrorism chief. Last June, the government took the opportunity to blame the Houthi for the kidnapping; the Houthi denied responsibility, and no one else stepped forward. Who is really responsible? Western consensus seems to be al-Qaeda, the other possibility is … anyone else. Perhaps the mystery will be dispelled soon.

Yemen and the GCC: a neighbor in need

January 9th, 2010
Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh

Yemeni President Ali Abdullah Saleh (Reuters)

I said it once before, but it bears repeating (especially by folks more credible than me). Professor Bernard Haykel in the National:

But the renascent al Qa’eda in Yemen may be the least threatening of the many challenges facing the government. Saleh is now trumpeting the presence of al Qa’eda to garner financial and military support from the West, but the funds and arms now being sent from Washington may be deployed against more threatening enemies, like the Houthis, or used to maintain the patronage networks that keep Saleh in power.

… in the aftermath of the Detroit incident Washington is abuzz with calls for increased funding and more direct military involvement. But this would be a grave mistake, and not only because armed intervention on behalf of the Yemeni government would appear to confirm al Qa’eda’s chosen narrative, in which the US is a vile anti-Muslim power that seeks to strengthen and maintain corrupt and illegitimate regimes at all costs, including the death of countless innocent civilians, while denying Muslims freedom and just governance. The United States and its western allies cannot defeat al Qa’eda in Yemen with military force; only Muslims, and their states, can win this war.

The power of this narrative should not be underestimated, particularly in Yemen, where these problems are all present and worse than in most (if not all) other Arab countries. In his op-ed, Professor Fawaz Georges advocates for League of Arab States involvement in addition to Yemen’s neighbors–I’m not sure what that would add–but the key is definitely the GCC, with Saudi in the lead. After all, Saudi has the most to lose. Heykel again:

Indeed, it is for Saudi Arabia and the other Gulf states that Yemen poses the most serious problem: a failed Yemen, with an active al Qa’eda presence and a radicalised and impoverished population is first and foremost a threat to its neighbours. An opportunity now exists for GCC states to take the lead in addressing the problems in Yemen, beginning with a major mediation effort to end military hostilities between the Houthis and the Yemeni army as well as the Houthis and Saudi forces. This should not be difficult to achieve: Qatar has already brokered an agreement in 2008 guaranteeing the Zaydis greater cultural and religious rights – which is all they seek – though Saleh has evaded and delayed its implementation.

Considering how involved the Saudis have become with the Houthi in the north, I’m not so sure a full-out reversal is as easy as Haykel makes it seem, but GCC mediation couldn’t hurt in either the north or the south.

The GCC, unlike the West, has the relationships and resources required to play a constructive role in Yemen, and the country’s neighbours, which have a serious long-term interest in solving Yemen’s problems, are not afflicted by the blinkered obsession with al Qa’eda that confines the American perspective.

The last part of that quote bears repeating itself: viewing Yemen only through the lens of counter-terrorism and al-Qaeda does no one any favors except Yemeni President Salih, who gets all the Western security assistance he wants to prolong other conflicts and remain in power. That’s putting it a bit crudely, but considering Yemen’s position in the bottom tiers of democracy and human rights indices, pervasive corruption means that U.S. aid won’t necessarily go where we want it to. Haykel, for the closer:

It must be remembered that one of the main reasons for Al-Qaeda’s renewed strength in Yemen is that the movement was defeated in Saudi Arabia, through the use of a clever combination of intelligence, security and propaganda tactics. The same can be undertaken in Yemen, to similar effect. But it will require a radical shift in strategic thinking in the Gulf – and especially in Saudi Arabia – predicated on the realisation that Yemen’s woes and a weak Yemeni state pose a severe threat to the regional order. Defeating al Qa’eda may be the West’s priority, but it is the GCC alone that can help put Yemen on the path to stability and prosperity – and only this, in the end, will deprive al Qa’eda of its firm footing on the Arabian Peninsula.

An Israeli human rights group asks the youth of Gaza: show us what your life is like

January 6th, 2010
A young Palestinian boy plays Counter-Strike at a makeshift arcade in Gaza. (Ynet)

A young Palestinian boy plays Counter-Strike at a makeshift arcade in Gaza. (Ynet)

Ynet (a popular online news website in Israel) just posted five of the videos resulting from a B’Tselem project that gave out 18 cameras to young people in Gaza. The short, subtitled clips are really interesting snapshots of life in Gaza, after the invasion and under blockade. I’ve been reading and researching about things like the smuggling tunnels for some time now, but I’ve never seen video from inside one–let alone hear the young Palestinian men talk about their work and why they do it: “There’s no work elsewhere, so we work here.” (No weapons for Hamas in this tunnel, they claim, just diapers and medicine. But they still pray before heading down into the tunnels, in case they become trapped by a partial cave-in.)

Another short clip acts as a kind of Slingshot Hip Hop in miniature (a documentary I’d highly recommend), wherein Gazan rapper Ayman explains how American hip hop can be deployed in Palestine: “Originally, rap is a Western art form, but … it’s about suffering and oppression. Rap was used in California against racism between whites and blacks”

“We in Gaza use this art to talk about our suffering as Palestinians,” Ayman said in the video. A year ago, he lost his father and his home in Israel’s invasion of Gaza. The end of the clip shows his bombed out apartment, where used to live. But just before that, he translates some graffiti for the camera: “Yes for the unity of Palestine. Yes for negotiation.” I was so impressed by the attitude of the rappers in Slingshot Hip Hop, which Ayman also seems to hold. They use rap, as a non-violent art form, to express sorrow and anger and loss and protest oppression. The lyrics may appear full of sadness and frustration, but it makes me so hopeful that these folks are attacking their problems in a constructive way. (Slingshot Hip Hop draws more parallels between American and Palestinian hip hop, by the way, looking to the problems of drugs and hopelessness in the Arab Israeli areas.)

A third clip was a delightful surprise: a small internet cafe, or arcade as they call it, where Palestinian boys play Counter-Strike, which was the one of the most popular online first-person shooting game (more than a few years back) in America. It plays on similar themes: outlet for frustrations, relief from boredom, a way of socializing. But there is a strong undercurrent of economic desperation, like for the boys in the tunnels: these kids would rather be doing something productive, but they can’t find any work. The other two clips focus on girls in Gaza, one documenting a field day for young girls injured in last year’s invasion (adorable singing of songs paired with startlingly forthright discussions about how they were hurt), and another about young Palestinian women playing soccer and finding other 0utlets/distractions at a summer camp. Definitely check them out.

al-Qaeda and Yemen: a primer

January 4th, 2010
A shadowy soldier stands guard in Old Ciy Sanaa (AFP)

A shadowy soldier stands guard in Old Ciy Sanaa (AFP)

For new and old readers alike, I thought I could pull together a short backgrounder on AQAP. Much of the following is adapted from a short piece on Yemen I wrote for CAP last summer after nine foreign workers were kidnapped last June.

Because of the foreigners’ nationalities and their work for a Christian organization, Al Qaeda is believed responsible for the kidnapping and murders. Responsibility for this attack would add to a long list of attacks that Al Qaeda is suspected of organizing in Yemen, including the bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in 2000 and the deadly 2008 assault on the U.S. embassy in the capital of Sanaa.

Al Qaeda’s Yemeni branch announced after President Barack Obama’s inauguration in January that a former Guantanamo detainee and Saudi citizen had reemerged as the deputy leader of the newly formed Al Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula—a group that combines the Yemeni and Saudi factions, with a Yemeni at its head. According to Gregory Johnsen (of Waq al-Waq fame), the aim of incorporating Saudi fighters is to use Yemen as a base for attacks through the region. The country’s reputation as a safe haven for terrorists has not been helped by Al Qaeda’s increasing visibility, or by the growth of a violent separatist movement in the South and a sporadic insurgency in the North, where thousands have been killed since 2005.

Add to that list of problems the fact that Yemen is running out of both oil and water, which means the government must also confront impending natural resource disasters. And Yemen, like other countries in the region, confronts a frustrating combination of economic and demographic problems, namely a large young population and high unemployment, which stood at 35 percent in 2003 (most reliable statistic I could find, I’m afraid).

Director of National Intelligence Dennis C. Blair said last February that, “Yemen is reemerging as a jihadist battleground and potential regional base of operations for al Qaeda to plan internal and external attacks, train terrorists, and facilitate the movement of operatives.” (How’s that for prescience?)

Yemen and the United States have cooperated on counterterrorism, but a number of security lapses have frustrated the relationship—most notably the escape of 23 Al Qaeda members from a prison in Sanaa and accusations by U.S. officials of paroling high-level and dangerous terrorists. Johnsen has long argued that the prison break marked the start of the latest phase of AQAP.

And what does this latest phase of AQAP look like? I will once again defer to the expert, Mr. Johnsen, who just published an article in Foreign Policy:

Yemen’s first two troubles, security and governance, are a combustible mix — and together they might explode in 2010 if al Qaeda consolidates its gains by taking advantage of a government in disarray. The organization, already the most regionally and economically representative of any group in the country, has only grown stronger over the past three years. Once disorganized and on the run, today al Qaeda members are putting down roots by marrying into local tribes and establishing a durable infrastructure that can survive the loss of key commanders. They have also launched a two-track policy of persuasion and intimidation, first by constructing a narrative of jihad that is broadly popular in Yemen, and second by assassinating or executing security officials who prove too aggressive in their pursuit of al Qaeda fighters. So, while U.S. President Barack Obama is busy trying to stamp out terrorist safe havens in Jalalabad and Waziristan, new ones are popping up in Marib, Shabwa, and al-Jawf.

That’s not to say that success in Af/Pak has led to the current situation in Yemen (and I’ve read too much of his stuff to infer that’s what Johnsen may have meant). It definitely has not. But there are certainly regional linkages: Al Qaeda’s regional merger (becoming AQAP) suggests that Yemen’s instability is not merely a local problem, but a broader regional issue. And Saudi Arabia increased border security in early 2008, reinforcing the concrete-filled security barrier that runs along portions of its border with Yemen, which remains porous. So conceivably Islamic militants from the Gulf region and beyond—including Afghanistan and Iraq—could cross the border into Yemen on a regular basis. Reports from the past summer, about Al Qaeda leaving Af/Pak for Yemen seemed poorly substantiated and misguided. But the official Yemeni response certainly hasn’t changed, at all, which isn’t exactly comforting, considering recent plots and threats.

June 11, 2009:

“Western think tanks say that al Qaeda has moved from Iraq and Afghanistan to Yemen but the truth of the matter is that this is exaggerated,” Abubakr al-Qirbi, the country’s foreign minister, said in Saudi-owned daily Asharq al-Awsat.

January 4, 2010:

“[Yemen's foreign minister, chief of national security and Interior Ministry] dismissed the threat posed by Al Qaeda in their country as “exaggerated” and downplayed the possibility of cooperating closely with the United States in fighting Islamic militants, even as the U.S. and Britain temporarily closed their diplomatic outposts in Yemen because of unspecified Al Qaeda threats.

Exaggerated, yes, perhaps. But I know a straw-man argument when I see one.

Obligatory Yemen post: diverging interests

January 3rd, 2010
Sanaa, occasionally and fittingly described as "gingerbread house-y"

Sanaa, occasionally and fittingly described as "gingerbread house-y"

Suddenly, it seems, everyone has an opinion on Yemen; rather than read me spouting off here, though, you’d be better served by looking to these folks: Christopher Boucek with a comprehensive op-ed in the Washington Post, and Gregory Johnsen at Waq al-Waq, my favorite Yemen blog, on Obama’s tact and Saudi involvement. Gregory offers up a quibble to Boucek’s policy advocacy that’s worth noting:

I would quibble and disagree with his suggestion that the US should focus aid on the Coast Guard. Within Yemen, the Coast Guard is already seen as being much too close to the US – what the US needs to do is to expand its contacts within the military (particularly those agencies headed by individuals from Sanhan) not deepen its contacts with the Coast Guard, which will be counterproductive: it will make the Coast Guard physically stronger, but weaken its influence in the Yemeni military and intelligence organizations, where it is already weak.

This very specific policy point is indicative of a more general problem: alignment of American and Yemeni interests. As a distant observer, it seems that American policy is preoccupied with counter-terrorism, while the Yemeni government is more focused on the Houthi in the north and the secessionists in the south, perhaps allowing AQAP to flourish while distracted. Certainly, the Yemeni government has stepped up raids against AQAP recently, but with much collateral damage. The U.S. is most definitely not going to start winning points by becoming associated with the bombing of civilians, in a country that isn’t exactly what I’d call pro-American.

Boucek outlines the better American approach in a Q&A posted at Carnegie Endowment:

Having outward American involvement in kinetic operations in Yemen would be probably the last thing you’d want to do because this will feed into the grievances that al-Qaeda is talking about, and it will make the central government weaker. So you want to help the Yemenis do these things by providing the training and the intelligence and the other things like that, and you want to build capacity inside Yemen to do these issues. You’ll need to do things like help Yemen develop effective counterterrorism laws so that they can prosecute people for fundraising and other things. You’ll need to help reform the prison service so people stay locked up. You need to do things to professionalize the police service to end the harassment and abuse by the police and the security services of the general public. This feeds into these other grievances. You don’t want to just securitize the problem. Part of this will be improving and expanding the amount  of foreign aid that goes into Yemen, that’s going to be improving and professionalizing the civil service, building capacity within the government to handle some of these issues.

Now comes the hard part: pulling all this off.

The risk is that Salih and the government will take Western/American funding for AQAP and use it to continue to fight in the north (where Saudi has also been fighting the Houthi) and the south. (Then again, al-Jazeera is reporting that the Houthi are preparing to negotiate with the government, after a recent offer to lay down arms. Non-Arabic readers can enjoy the very blurry celebratory photo of the Houthi at the top.) But either way, I’d rather not think about what will happen if AQAP can pull of an attack against an American target, provoking outcry for a “response.” Overt American involvement does not make sense on any level–like Boucek said, it will just feed grievances that are already simmering.

Not to make light of the war in Iraq, but … really, stenographers?

December 15th, 2009

What happens when four knights of the realm and a baroness hold inquiries on British involvement in the 2003 invasion and subsequent occupation of Iraq?

One BBC critic likened the atmosphere to a village cricket match, and others have offered unfavorable comparisons with the cut and thrust of war hearings on Capitol Hill.

In that sense, the inquiry has been faithful to Mr. Brown’s stipulation that it not “apportion blame.” That approach cut little ice with antiwar protesters who appeared outside the hearing in its early days wearing scowling face masks in the likenesses of Mr. Blair, Mr. Brown and Mr. Bush, and clutching handfuls of fake dollar bills soaked in fake blood.

But there have been no disruptions inside the hearings, and even some light-hearted moments. Some have flowed from overhead monitors offering a running transcript of the hearings, and what they have betrayed of the stenographers’ struggles with unfamiliar military terms or Arab names. One controversial figure in Iraqi politics, Ahmed Chalabi, appeared on the monitors as “Alcohol Chalabi,” to subdued merriment.

The promised land: New Jersey?

November 25th, 2009

A Newsweek reporter, Maziar Bahari, wrote an account of his captivity in an Iranian prison this past summer, following the disputed elections. The account is brilliantly written and heartbreaking, but also filled with some absurd moments that would be achingly funny in any other context.

One such moment has been reported all over the place: how he was interrogated because of a seconds-long moment of an interview for the Daily Show.

Ridiculously long block quotes after the jump.

Read the rest of this entry »

The twin tragedies of Fort Hood

November 10th, 2009

Some of the reactions to the Fort Hood massacre defy all logic. Take Jeffrey Goldberg, who takes issue with the fact that massacres often teach us nothing more than that the individual was deeply psychologically disturbed. NOT SO FAST, he and Andrew Sullivan say: THEY WERE MUSLIM/ARABS! But this godamn liberal American army was too P.C. to say anything.

As an aside, this kind of discourse always conflates the two (Muslims/Arabs): after all, all Muslims are Arabs (well, no, really only 20% of the world’s Muslims are Arab)–and all Arabs are Muslims (no, actually only 25% of Arabs in the United States are Muslims). Prejudice knows no facts, only linkages based on identity–a practice more broadly understood as either racism or racial profiling.

Both Goldberg and Sullivan effectively call for investigations into American Arabs/Muslims, particularly those in the military. Right, good idea: let’s alienate the few Arabs/Muslims who love their country–in spite of their country’s and fellow soldiers’ prejudices against them, drawn out by incidents like the Fort Hood massacre–enough to die for it.

Fort Hood was incredibly tragic, and incredibly sad. Did Major Hasan scream Allahu Akbar? It does not matter. He may have believed himself to be religiously motivated, he may have had ties to radicalizing Imams, but at the end of the day — he was clearly disturbed. Indeed, the military and society as a whole should watch out for people who gave warning signs of mental instability — but not warning signs based on their religious or ethnic identity, which is what Goldberg and Sullivan are demanding

There are so many underlying assumptions to Goldberg’s arguments that I’m going a little crazy myself trying to unpack all of them. I really can’t focus on it for too long, because my blood will literally boil. TNC took him down at the obvious point: what do we learn by focusing on Islam as the cause of violence?

I think this mostly hinges on what “means” means. If we grant that Hasan was motivated by religion, what does that actually tell us? What is there  beyond the fact that people will, at times, interpret religion as a justification to commit heinous acts? … That’s really my issue. What is the big “thing” that we should be seeing, in this case? What are those elite blinders preventing us from seeing?

Goldberg’s response is telling:

Let me use an example from my own religious group (I’m Jewish, in case any of you were wondering) to illustrate a possible answer to this question. Jonathan Pollard, an intelligence analyst for the Navy, was convicted of spying on behalf of Israel in 1986. Pollard’s actions cast a shadow over many Jews working in the American national security apparatus. Loyal Americans were questioned, and sometimes denied security clearances, simply because they were Jewish, or had visited Israel. The FBI pursued some dubious cases, including the recently-aborted prosecution of two former AIPAC employees, in large part because of fears that another Pollard was lurking somewhere inside the American government.

Was it fair that loyal American Jews had their patriotism questioned by the FBI? No. Was it right of the FBI, in the wake of the Pollard case, to be concerned that Israel, having turned one American Jew into a spy, had turned others? Unfortunately, yes. I’m not excusing the witch-hunts that took place after the Pollard scandal, but I am saying that it would have been a dereliction of duty on the part of the FBI to ignore, because of political correctness, an actual threat. Ultimately, it was the fault of Jonathan Pollard, and the Israeli officials who used him as a spy, that innocent American Jews were suspected of spying for Israel.

Here’s the logic: America has wrongly used racial profiling in the past to discrimate against ethnic groups. Therefore, we should commit that same wrong again, because political correctness endangers us. Plus, it’s the terrorist’s fault anyway that people who have similar background are then discriminated against.

Here’s Goldberg’s logic applied to another historical example: America put Japanese-Americans in internment camps during World War II. It was wrong. But, they were a threat. Anyway, it’s the Japanese’s fault: they shouldn’t have bombed Pearl Harbor in the first place.

What Goldberg/Sullivan’s argument misses is the motivation behind attacks like September 11th, or the violence at Fort Hood: terrorists use violence to achieve their ends. Marc Lynch brilliantly describes why Goldberg/Sullivan’s arguments are so dangerous: they in fact, fulfill, the goals of terrorists like th 9/11 hijackers:

Since the Ft Hood atrocity, I’ve seen a meme going around that it somehow  exposed a contradiction between “political correctness” and “security.”  The avoidance of Nidal Hassan’s religion out of fear of offending anyone, goes the argument, created the conditions which allowed him to go undetected and unsanctioned in the months and years leading up to his rampage.  American security, therefore, demands dropping the “political correctness” of avoiding a  confrontation with Islamist ideas and asking the “tough questions” about Islam as a religion and the loyalty of Muslim-Americans.

This framing of the issue is almost 100% wrong.    There is a connection between what these critics are calling “political correctness” and national security, but it runs in the opposite direction.   The real linkage is that there is a strong security imperative to prevent the consolidation of a narrative in which America is engaged in a clash of civilizations with Islam, and instead to nurture a narrative in which al-Qaeda and its affiliates represent a marginal fringe to be jointly combatted. Fortunately, American leaders — from the Obama administration through General George Casey and top counter-terrorism officials — understand this and have been acting appropriately.

It’s worth walking through the connection once again, because how America responds to Ft. Hood really is important in the wider attempt to change the nature of its engagement with Muslim publics across the world.  Get the response right, as the administration thus far has done, and they show that things really have changed.  Get it wrong, as its critics demand, and the world could tumble back down into the ‘clash of civilizations’ trap which al-Qaeda so dearly wants and which the improved American approach of the last couple of years has increasingly denied it.

Terrorism is a means towards that end.  The object is to create a violent, polarized environment in which Muslims are forced to embrace a narrow, extreme version of Muslim identity.   They want Muslims to accept a master narrative in which the Islamic umma is existentially threatened by Western aggression, and the only theologically and strategically appropriate individual response is to join the jihad in the path of god (as they have defined it).

They recognize that most Muslims won’t embrace this radical conception of their identity just through messaging, internet rhetoric, or preaching. To make inroads with mainstream Muslim communities, they need to change the context in which they live — to render their status quo unacceptable and to make their narrative resonate.  And for that to happen, they need a lot of help — for the targeted governments to take inflammatory measures against their Muslim populations, for the non-Muslim citizens in the targeted countries to discriminate against them, and for the media to fan the flames of hatred and mistrust.

Understanding this strategy points towards some fairly obvious guidelines for judging various responses.   Al-Qaeda and its affiliated ideologues don’t just want their targets to overreact with blanket crackdowns on the mainstream Muslim community — they are counting on it.  They want to create a homogenous, undifferentiated Islam on whose behalf they speak and a coherent master narrative which justifies and validates their actions. American reactions which feed AQ’s master narrative, lump together disparate Muslim movements, and tar a wide range of Muslims with the AQ brush therefore serve al-Qaeda’s strategy.  Responses which disrupt AQ’s narrative, disaggregate the Muslim world and relegate AQ to a marginal fringe frustrate its strategy.

I’m proud of the Obama Administration’s response thus far, which has not given into racial or religious prejudice and fearmongering. Fort Hood was tragic. Investigations will determine if he had terrorist connections, etc.

But there is another tragedy that can be averted: the impulse toward racial profiling, alienating Arabs and Muslims, and all the accompanying garbage to the “clash of civilizations” narrative. It would be so sad to fall back into that trap because of the senseless violence of one disturbed individual.